

SCENARIO ORDER OF BATTLE

MILL SPRINGS



BROTHER against BROTHER

the drawing of the sword



BATTLE OF MILL SPRINGS: THE BATTLE WITH MANY NAMES (JANUARY 19, 1862)

by Bill Battle

INTRODUCTION

It was a tragedy of errors.

One by one, commands across the two warring nations learned under fire. Some found immediate success. Others turned minor mistakes into major blunders. And forces from the United States and Confederate States based in Kentucky learned the same hard lessons their brothers in arms had discovered the previous summer at other places of conflict.

Meeting at a location reported by the Mill Springs Battlefield Association to have more names than any other battle (nine), troops from the warring sides met at Mill Springs, Fishing Creek, Logan's Cross Roads, Beech Grove, Somerset or any of a number of other names given to the action which drove the Confederates from Eastern Kentucky in early 1862. The battle also marked the rise or fall of many early war commanders.

KENTUCKY, THE NEUTRAL STATE




At the outbreak of the war, Kentucky had declared its neutrality. Both sides quickly eyed the Bluegrass State as a key to waging successful war, with its importance most succinctly having been stated by President Abraham Lincoln, who is reported to have said, "I hope to have God on my side, but I must have Kentucky."

Supported by the state legislature, Gov. Magoffin turned down Lincoln's request for troops following Fort Sumter and declared Kentucky a neutral state in May of 1861.

However, forces from both inside and outside the Bluegrass State conspired to make Kentucky choose its course.

The Kentucky State Guard was formed under Simon B. Buckner to enforce neutrality. When it became apparent that the new force had Confederate leanings, the Kentucky Home Guard started to take shape with arms being supplied by the Federals.

Elections in the summer of 1861 saw Unionist gains in the congressional and state races. Magoffin was stripped of his military powers and eventually resigned in August of 1862.



With Kentuckians starting to take up arms, both sides watched what was happening with great interest.

A neutral Kentucky served as a buffer between the warring sides. However, Kentucky also could give each side a strategic advantage in winning the war. A Federal Kentucky would put Union troops on the north border of Tennessee with opportunities to also move into western Virginia and down the Mississippi River. A Confederate Kentucky would put the South on the Ohio River with the chance to threaten Cincinnati and sever Federal supply lines.

Urged by Unionists in eastern Tennessee, President Lincoln moved to act by mustering three regiments of infantry from eastern Kentucky and Tennessee under U.S. Navy Lt. William Nelson.

Nelson established camps in Kentucky for the training and arming of forces loyal to the Union. The main one was Camp Dick Robinson (named for the land's owner), roughly halfway between Cincinnati and Tennessee. Another facility, set up by Naval Lt. Samuel Cooper, was established near Barbourville. It was called Camp Andy Johnson after Tennessee politician Andrew Johnson (and future Vice President and President). Troops trained at the two camps were to help to liberate east Tennessee as well as secure Kentucky.

The Federal Department of Kentucky had been created in Cincinnati under Brig. Gen. Robert Anderson, the commander at Fort Sumter. This command later grew to include Tennessee as the renamed Department of the Cumberland.

The Confederates made the first move into the state. Forces under Maj. Gen. Leonidas Polk and Brig. Gen. Gideon Pillow occupied the bluffs over the Mississippi River at Columbus and the town of Hickman. Castigated by their superiors, the Confederates were ordered to adhere to the state's neutrality, but the trap had been sprung. Soon, both sides were moving forces into the neutral state, which later declared it would remain in the Union.

Anderson's Department of the Cumberland was relocated to Louisville. Another Federal commander, Brig. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant, took Paducah. Anderson started to acquire subordinate officers who would play key roles in the war as well. Accepting positions in the department were Brig. Gen. George H. Thomas and Brig. Gen. William T. Sherman, who had been among those commanding a brigade at Manassas in July.

Thomas replaced Nelson at Camp Dick Robinson when Nelson was detailed to the task of freeing eastern Kentucky and Tennessee. Thomas had

about 9,000 men under his command at Camp Dick Robinson with infantry being the 1st and 2nd East Tennessee regiments, the 3rd and 4th Kentucky regiments, the 14th, 17th and 38th Ohio regiments and the 33rd Indiana regiment. He had the 1st Kentucky Cavalry and three batteries of light artillery (two from Kentucky, one from Ohio) as well.

Anderson relinquished department command Oct. 8 due to poor health and Sherman took over.

In the South, the Confederacy also was organizing quickly. Gen. Albert S. Johnston, another native of Kentucky, had been detailed to command the Confederate forces in Tennessee. Johnston used three different forces to advance into Kentucky and secure the Confederacy's northern frontier in that vulnerable area.




Polk remained at Columbus, Kentucky, holding on to key bluffs which controlled the vital Mississippi River. Johnston established a strong middle defense in Tennessee with the building of Forts Henry and Donelson to guard the Tennessee and Cumberland River approaches into Tennessee, and brought troops to Bowling Green in order to hold a central strong point in the defensive line.

In the east, Johnston turned to Brig. Gen. Felix Zollicoffer to both hold the perilous eastern part of Tennessee and to move into Kentucky while controlling the Cumberland Gap.

Zollicoffer, a former newspaper editor, politician and militia officer, had the toughest task of the group. He neither enjoyed a strong position, nor had well-equipped troops, nor was in a friendly area. He was forced to use many of his men to police eastern Tennessee as Unionists caused havoc. Still, he eventually was able to move into Kentucky by the end of the year. His first move was to establish Camp Buckner at Cumberland Ford.

At Camp Buckner, Zollicoffer had the 11th, 17th, 19th and 20th Tennessee Infantry regiments, the 15th Mississippi infantry regiment, eight companies of cavalry from the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Tennessee Cavalry battalions, and Rutledge's Tennessee Battery.

As 1861 came to a close, the opposing forces were set in place.



NEUTRAL NO MORE

Kentucky shed its neutrality Sept. 18, 1861, siding with the Federals while condemning the Confederate advance. In the North, the state fell under the command of Maj. Gen. Henry Halleck in St. Louis (Department of Missouri) and Brig. Gen. Don Carlos Buell (Department of the Ohio) to divide operations in the state between them. Buell, who had been helping Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan in Washington, D.C., took over from Sherman Nov. 15, 1861. That same day, Maj. Gen. George Crittenden took over Zollicoffer's position, but retained the old commander as leader of the district's first division. Additionally, it took some time for Crittenden to actually make it to Zollicoffer's forces as he made a trip to Richmond to visit the Confederate high command.

Buell started to reorganize his command. Brig. Gen. George Thomas was assigned one of the five divisions created during the reorganization. Other divisions went to Brig. Gen. Alexander McCook, Brig. Gen. Ormsby Mitchel, Brig. Gen. William Nelson, and Brig. Gen. Thomas L. Crittenden (younger brother of the Confederate general).

Thomas, who made his headquarters in Lebanon, Kentucky, had four brigades under his command and a number of unattached units.

Leading the Union's First Brigade was Brig. Gen. Albin Schoepf, a veteran of the Austrian army. His units were the 33rd Indiana, 17th Ohio, 12th Kentucky and 38th Ohio. The second brigade was led by Col. Mahlon Manson and consisted of the 4th Kentucky, 14th Ohio, 10th Indiana and 10th Kentucky infantry regiments. The Third Brigade was led by Col. Robert McCook and consisted of the newly-created 18th U.S., 35th Ohio, 9th Ohio and 2nd Minnesota regiments. Acting Brig. Gen. Samuel Carter had the 1st East Tennessee, 2nd East Tennessee, 12th Ohio and 38th Ohio. Unattached units were the 1st Kentucky Cavalry and three batteries of light artillery. Two were from the 1st Ohio and the final one was from Kentucky. In the South, Johnston had established his defensive line. Zollicoffer and his forces, mainly from Tennessee, pushed through the Cumberland Gap and advanced 70 miles northwest to advance the eastern end of Confederate outposts.

First contact was made near Barbourville, as Zollicoffer sent an 800-man detachment under Col. Joel Battle of the 20th Tennessee to disperse Camp Andrew Johnson. This had been a base of operations for Unionists who had

hoped to free eastern Tennessee from the Confederacy. The Confederate force arrived Sept. 19, 1861, to find that the Federal recruits had been moved on to Camp Dick Robinson, and only a small local unit remained. The Confederates routed the home guard, under Capt. Isaac Black and captured weapons and supplies.

Another Confederate raid succeeded at Laurel Bridge and the Goose Creek Salt Works Sept. 28. The main adversaries collided again Oct. 21, 1861, at Wild Cat Mountain. Samuel Carter, a former U.S. Navy lieutenant and acting brigadier general (he later became the only American officer to hold the ranks of major general and rear admiral), chose that site for another camp. Col. Frank Wolford's 1st Kentucky Cavalry moved to set up Camp Wild Cat. Thomas sent the 7th Kentucky Infantry (led by Col. Theophilus T. Garrard) to reinforce Camp Wild Cat. Garrard was reinforced by Schoepf's brigade and the latter took overall command. Zollicoffer attacked with a bigger force, 7,500 to 5,400, but the Federals made better use of natural cover and fortifications. The 33rd Indiana, under Col. John Coburn, took much of the Confederate attack. Initially, the 11th Tennessee of Col. James Rains attacked. A second effort on the camp was made by Col. Tazwell Neuman and his 17th Tennessee.



For the battle, the Confederates suffered 53 casualties (11 killed, 42 wounded) to 25 (four killed, 21 wounded) for the Federals. Despite having more troops, Zollicoffer was unable to exploit his advantage and retreated.

After Wild Cat Mountain, Zollicoffer proposed defending Cumberland Gap as it was a better defensive location than Camp Buckner. He proposed pulling his defensive line back south of Cumberland Gap. Soon after that, Zollicoffer flip-flopped his position and went on the offensive south of Monticello, Kentucky. Zollicoffer's inconsistency on his command's stance would lead to problems later.

On Nov. 8, partisans burned four bridges in eastern Tennessee ahead of an expected Federal advance which did not materialize. This led to the Confederates to send reinforcements and put down the insurrection.

Nelson, elevated to brigadier general in the army by this point, won a victory over Confederates under Col. John Williams at Ivy Mountain, Nov. 8-9, and followed up by occupying Pikeville Nov. 9.

From there, both sides moved to fill the void in southeastern Kentucky. The campaign for the Bluegrass State was on.



MOVES, COUNTER MOVES AND CONTACT

Zollicoffer finally decided to move his force to Mill Springs, Kentucky, a location with a 200-foot bluff which controlled the south bank of the Cumberland River and had a grist and saw mill. Controlling the river would allow his command to be resupplied by river from Nashville, much easier than trying to move supplies over treacherous roads from Knoxville in the dead of winter.

In the meantime, Capt. Boston Dillion of the 1st Kentucky Cavalry had been ordered to move across from Mill Springs. Instead, he decided to stop at the Fishing Creek defensive positions.

Had Zollicoffer faced any opposition or had he listened to his engineers, who were busy working on building boats to send forces across the river in early December, he might have lasted through the winter. But Zollicoffer decided to push forward, boosted by a small skirmish Dec. 4 in which elements of the 17th Ohio Regiment were driven back.


“The result of your crossing the river now will be that you will be repulsed and lose all the artillery taken over,” wrote Capt. Thomas Estill, one of the engineers for Zollicoffer’s army.

Zollicoffer would find out the hard way that Estill’s prediction would come true. Still, Zollicoffer insisted upon crossing the river in force to solidify its control.

On Dec. 5, Zollicoffer’s cavalry ran into the Federal positions at Fishing Creek. During the brief encounter, the Federal pickets were pushed back across the creek with some prisoners taken by the Confederates. In another skirmish, part of Schoepf’s staff was captured at another ford of Fishing Creek. After that, Schoepf decided to withdraw Col. John Connell’s 17th Ohio and other forces from the Fishing Creek, Waitsboro (upstream from Mill Springs) and Somerset.

On Dec. 6, Zollicoffer decided to continue moving his men north of the river, despite having not heard from Gen. A.S. Johnston on his communications of Nov. 27 and Nov. 30. The 16th Alabama Infantry was the first unit to cross, joining a hand-picked contingent of the 20th Tennessee and the cavalry. The 19th Tennessee and 25th Tennessee followed suit. Camp was set about a mile north of the river on an elevated area in a beech grove. The rest of the 20th Tennessee crossed Dec. 6-7.

After receiving orders to return to Mill Springs, Zollicoffer delayed, insisting upon trying to have his position heard. Beech Grove was a fine defensive spot with both flanks anchored. However, higher command saw



it too easy for the river to be forded either upstream or downstream for the Federals to cut off the command. Prior to the arrival of Crittenden, Zollicoffer did everything possible to fortify the position. An abatis was placed in front of the breastworks.

“This camp is immediately opposite Mill Springs, 1 1/4 mile, distant. The river protects our rear and flanks. We have about 1,200 yards fighting front to defend, which we are entrenching as rapidly as our few tools will allow. The position I occupy north of the river is a fine basis for operations in front. It is a much stronger natural position for defense than that on the south bank. I think it should be held at all hazards,” Zollicoffer wrote Johnston.

With that, Zollicoffer justified his position north of the Cumberland.


Even with orders to move back, why did Zollicoffer stay at Beech Grove? Perhaps the will to continue to move towards the enemy drove him. By that time, Zollicoffer was aggressive in trying to find the enemy and guard his encampment. Perhaps, knowing how hard his men had worked in setting up the camp, Zollicoffer did not want to uproot them from what they had made. Perhaps the struggle with camp maladies made Zollicoffer not want to move. Like their Federal counterparts, the Confederates at Beech Grove were suffering from all of the miseries of camp life. Measles hit the Tennessee men on both sides particularly hard. Typhoid and pneumonia also were killers.

With the arrival of Maj. Gen. George Crittenden, overall command passed from Zollicoffer. Reinforcements also were expected from Brig. Gen. William Carroll’s brigade, but trouble finding sufficient arms for the men led to it being sent forth piecemeal, starting with Col. Moses White’s 37th Tennessee, which left Knoxville Dec. 28. Carroll’s command started to arrive Jan. 15 along with six guns from Capt. George Monsarrat’s battery.

In the meantime, several skirmishes took place as the armies moved into position.

On Jan. 7, the steamboat *Noble Ellis* arrived carrying supplies from Nashville. For much of the way, the boat had a cavalry escort on the northern bank. The Federals attempted to interdict the boat’s passage, but miscalculated its position and thus missed an interception.

Buell told Thomas and Schoepf to concentrate their commands for movement against Zollicoffer. He envisioned a two-pronged attack to send the Confederates back to Tennessee.



“It is not sufficient to hold Zollicoffer in check; he must be captured or dispersed.”


Crittenden utilized the *Noble Ellis* to help pick up supplies as foraging expeditions were being sent out daily to help try to supply the Confederates. It was during some of these missions that the Southern commander started to find out that the Union forces were moving against him. It was only a matter of time before the Federals, heading toward Somerset, and the Confederates, sending foraging parties out from Beech Grove, would meet.

On Jan. 15, a Confederate foraging party discovered that Faubush Creek was not fordable. The area’s streams, which had been low, were coming up with the recent rain.

That led to Mill Springs, the battle with many names.

Manson’s brigade moved out and had to deal with poor road and bridge conditions while laboring to make it to join Schoepf. In the meantime, Schoepf was trying to figure out a location for attacking the Confederates in their works. But before the Federals were able to find an optimal way to attack the Beech Grove encampment – by then protected by trenchworks, abatis, and artillery redoubts – the Confederates spilled out of it and came looking for a fight. It was early in the morning of Jan. 19, and that day’s events would change the future of the war in Kentucky.

Those troops as they marched were afflicted by the cold and rain, but this was not the first or last time that the elements would have an impact on the day’s battle. First, the Cumberland River, which had come up from its low December stage, forced the hand of the overall area Confederate commander, Maj. Gen. George Crittenden during the period leading to the battle. On Jan. 19 itself, heavy rain continued to fall, making movement difficult for soldiers on both sides. Moreover, the rain also fouled muskets: many of the Confederates were using flintlocks, which would not fire in the wet conditions. Even the Federals had to pause after the battle to issue dry ammunition to the troops. Also, there was fog, which made spotting the enemy even tougher, especially for the near-sighted local Confederate commander in the white raincoat, Brig. Gen. Felix Zollicoffer, who was to pay dearly for his inability to tell friend from foe.




THE COMMANDERS

Later in the war, George Thomas would be called “The Rock of Chickamauga” for his stand at that Georgia battlefield in November of 1863. But in 1861 and early 1862, Thomas was a rarity in the Federal forces as a Virginian who stayed loyal to the United States. So, not only did he have to fight his family (his sisters disowned him), but he also had to continuously prove his loyalty to those suspicious of his background. As a youth, his family was caught in the middle of Nat Turner’s slave revolt in 1831. He attended the U.S. Military Academy and graduated 12th in the Class of 1840. He immediately saw action against the Seminoles in Florida and later earned commendations for gallantry at Monterey and Buena Vista during the Mexican War. After that war, he served in the cavalry in Texas. In January of 1861, Thomas applied for the commandant’s job at Virginia Military Institute. In March of 1861, Thomas was offered the position of Virginia chief of ordnance by Gov. John Letcher. He turned that spot down and stayed with the U.S. Army. In the opening months of the war, he was a colonel in charge of a brigade of troops under Brig. Gen. Robert Patterson in the Shenandoah Valley. In the shakeup of commanders after Patterson’s failure to check Confederate Gen. Joseph Johnston’s movement to support Brig. Gen. Pierre G.T. Beauregard at the Battle of First Manassas, or First Bull Run, Thomas was promoted to brigadier general of volunteers Aug. 17, 1861, and sent to Kentucky.

Confederate Maj. Gen. George B. Crittenden was the area commander in charge of the Confederate defenses in eastern Tennessee and Kentucky starting with his appointment to head the District of East Tennessee Dec. 8, 1861. Under the overall control of Gen. Albert S. Johnston, Crittenden was responsible for operating a chain of outposts along the Tennessee-Kentucky frontier. As Kentucky had proclaimed its neutrality, it should have been a buffer between Tennessee and the Federal bases in the northern states. Nobody believed Kentucky’s neutrality would hold up and the outposts were the Confederacy’s way of checking the buffer zone.

The local commander for the Confederates in the Cumberland Gap area was Brig. Gen. Felix Zollicoffer. A former newspaper editor and



Whig politician, Zollicoffer had done everything he could to prevent war from happening. He had been at the Peace Conference in Washington, D.C., earlier in 1861, trying to smooth things over between the sides. But when that failed, he became a brigadier general of Tennessee state troops around the time Fort Sumter was taken. After that, he was accepted into Confederate service at the same rank. On July 9, 1861, Zollicoffer was made head of the District of East Tennessee, Department No. 2. When Crittenden came, Zollicoffer remained as leader of the department's 1st Brigade.

By all accounts, Zollicoffer was popular not only among his men, but also with civilians his command passed.

"He was the only Confederate General I ever saw and I think still he was the finest that ever commanded troops in this section of Kentucky," John W. Simpson, a young boy who lived near Bronston, Kentucky, later recalled. "He did not allow his troops to steal from citizens. One of his soldiers stole a goose at Mill Springs and he had him pay \$50 for it."

In camp, Zollicoffer was subjected to many of the same hardships as his troops, which further endeared him to them. And, on Christmas Eve, 1861, he ordered two gallons of whiskey be distributed to every company.


Unlike many of the political generals, Zollicoffer did have some military training. He was a veteran of the Seminole War, where he served for a year as a first lieutenant in the Florida fighting. Zollicoffer realized the importance of controlling the Cumberland Gap, and late in 1861, he moved his men through the gap and into Kentucky.

QUESTIONABLE JUDGMENT

But Zollicoffer was subject to major lapses. Camped at Beech Grove, Kentucky, Zollicoffer put his command on the north side of the Cumberland River, despite direction from Johnston not to do so. Zollicoffer had moved to that location, his proposed base of winter operations, so he could draw supplies from Nashville by river rather than from Knoxville by perilous roads.

Meanwhile, Thomas was concentrating his forces at Columbia, Kentucky, for the winter. This was a position which would allow him the opportunity to defend against either Johnston or Zollicoffer. Other smaller forces were left at Crab Orchard, London and Somerset.

By the time Crittenden arrived, he had trouble. The Confederates were caught between a Rock (of Chickamauga, Thomas's future nickname) and a



hard place (the swollen Cumberland River). There were not many options. Just moving the men across the river under those conditions was going to be tough. But that also would mean the loss of artillery, ammunition and supplies which would have to be left to the enemy. Crittenden ordered Zollicoffer to withdraw to the south side of the river in late November. Had Zollicoffer acted immediately, he would have recrossed during a period of low water on the Cumberland. In fact, the water was low enough that the smallest of the steamers sent from Nashville with supplies had trouble making the voyage.

"I infer from yours that I should not have crossed the river, but now it is too late. My means of recrossing is so limited, I could hardly accomplish it in the face of the enemy," Zollicoffer wrote Johnston on Dec. 10, 1861.


Actually, Zollicoffer had time if he would have acted at that moment. The two sides would not clash for more than a month, and that would come with the Confederates advancing to instigate the battle. Had Zollicoffer known that Thomas did not start his advance from his base at Lebanon, Kentucky, until Jan. 1, 1862, and was encountering horrible road conditions, he might have had the chance to pull back. But he did not. It took 17 day for Thomas to reach Logan's Cross Roads and even longer for other reinforcements to concentrate.

Crittenden arrived to find the orders had not been obeyed on Jan. 3. Zollicoffer had fortified his position between the Cumberland River and Fishing Creek, but Crittenden decided it was not enough. Federal forces arrived at Fishing Creek Jan. 17, and planned to continue moving toward contact.

Crittenden, unaware of the closing Federal forces until it was too late to retreat, decided there was just one alternative – attack the enemy before they could threaten the Confederate camps. He moved out his forces. Confederate cavalry met Federal pickets of Manson's 10th Indiana about 2 a.m. on the morning of Jan. 18. The "Battle of Many Names" was getting closer to taking place.

THE BATTLE BEGINS

Crittenden did what he could. He formed his command into two brigades. Zollicoffer commanded the 1st Brigade, which consisted of the 15th Mississippi, 16th Alabama, 19th Tennessee, 20th Tennessee, 25th Tennessee, four guns and two companies of cavalry. The 2nd Brigade was led by Brig. Gen. William Carroll (son of a six-time Tennessee governor) and consisted of 17th Tennessee, 28th Tennessee, 29th Tennessee, 37th Tennessee, two artillery pieces and cavalry. Carroll was placed in charge of this force despite his recent arrival from the Memphis area.



At least one of the regiments was not at full staff. The commander of the 15th Mississippi, Col. Winfield Statham (who later commanded a brigade at Shiloh, but never made the general's rank), had taken leave and headed to Bowling Green to try to convince Gen. Albert S. Johnston to transfer his unit to that outpost. In his absence, the regiment was led by Lt. Col. Edward Walthall, who later ascended to major general.


Crittenden had scouting reports that the Federals were separated by Fishing Creek. He had hoped that by attacking quickly he would have the luck of overpowering one portion of the enemy. Several things would have to go right, though. Crittenden banked on Fishing Creek being too badly flooded for the Federals to reinforce. Unfortunately for the Confederates, this proved to be a false assumption. Another report stated that only two regiments occupied Logan's Cross Roads, but that also was wrong information: the Federals in fact had eight regiments there at the time.

Writing Johnston, Crittenden stated he was "threatened by a superior force of the enemy in front, and finding it impossible to cross the river, I will have to make a fight on the ground I now occupy." Crittenden had hoped Johnston would demonstrate to draw forces away from his position, but the note had to be delivered by horseback. That would take time - time Crittenden did not have.

On the night of the 17th, Crittenden held a council of war. He later reported the officers were unanimous in supporting the decision to attack. Reportedly, Zollicoffer never voted and said he would go because he was ordered to go. Thomas was prepared for the action. He had sent out scouts, who reported the Confederates were getting ready to leave their fortifications. Both brigades moved forward on the morning of Jan. 19, 1862, with about 4,600 men, enough to displace the two regiments of Federal infantry Crittenden thought he would be facing.

Placed in the lead of the march (behind screening cavalry) was the 15th Mississippi. The Confederates labored for about nine miles along a muddy Mill Springs Road in a heavy rain and cold temperatures. "It was the most cheerless and disagreeable night I ever experienced," wrote Lt. Albert Roberts of the 20th Tennessee.

Eventually, the Confederates made contact with the Federals. Crittenden had hoped to hit the Federals quickly and overcome the expected two regiments. Therefore, he did not put in orders to hit the line without forming into a battle line. The Confederate cavalry found the pickets of the 1st Kentucky Cavalry



near the crossing of Timmy's Branch about 6:10 a.m. The 15th Mississippi's E Co., the McClung Rifles, was given the task of clearing the rest of the cavalry from the route of advance. While the encounter led to a few casualties, it also gave the Federals more warning that the Confederates were on the march.

Driving in the advance guard, the Confederates continued to move forward. Next in the line of attack were two companies of the 10th Indiana (K and I) located near Burton's Hill. First coming upon the 10th Indiana's Co. K, the 15th Mississippi advanced two companies, E and G (the Granada Rifles) as skirmishers. Both had been trained as Zouave skirmishers and were advancing in a line deployed eight paces apart. About 6:40 a.m., the engagement had drawn in the two companies of the 15th Mississippi with the 10th Indiana and the remaining Federal cavalry.

Crittenden, who had deployed most of his cavalry to the rear of the column, had no idea his forces had been halted by two companies of infantry. Zollicoffer was convinced that he was facing much more than that and deployed his men into a line of battle, again wasting time. The failure to properly plan for the attack was costing the Confederates dearly. The 15th Mississippi was deployed to the right side of the road. The 19th Tennessee was ordered to deploy on the other side of the road.


THE BATTLE HEATS UP

Here, south of Logan's Cross Roads, at Burton's Hill in an area known to the locals as the "Old Fields," the general battle was engaged. It was 6:35 a.m.

At the Federal camp, the Union forces stirred and started to move once the alarm was sent. The long roll played and the rest of the 10th Indiana started to move in support of their comrades. Included in that number was 1st Lt. Lew Wallace, who later would become a Federal general, and is most famous for his controversial performance at Shiloh and writing Ben-Hur: A Tale of the Christ years after the war.

Reinforced by the 20th Tennessee and the 25th Tennessee, the Confederates hit the 10th Indiana's advanced force (many of them Rich Mountain and Wild Cat Mountain veterans), which was being reinforced by other elements of its regiment. Col. Mahlon Manson, an acting brigadier general, summoned the rest of his brigade to repel the Confederate attack.

With superior numbers engaged, the Confederates pushed the 10th Indiana back off the hill. Under the direction of Maj. Abram Miller, the units of the



10th Indiana reformed past the crest of the hill. Zollicoffer was cautious in his scouting, feeling that some sort of ambush awaited his men. Meanwhile, the rest of the 10th Indiana (coordinated by Lt. Col. William Kise) and the 1st Kentucky Cavalry was on the way at the head of Federal units looking to reinforce their brothers in arms.

Scouting ahead, Walthall and the 15th Mississippi found the Federals. After an exchange of volleys, the Confederates charged with the famous Rebel Yell.

The Confederate advance against the 10th Indiana and the 1st Kentucky Cavalry continued with the 19th Tennessee in the lead on the left side of the road. The 15th Mississippi, hit hard by the early action, was followed by the 20th Tennessee and the 25th Tennessee, which had been redeployed on that side of the road as well. By 7:25 a.m., four guns of Rutledge's battery (under Lt. Eugene Falconnet) had arrived on the southern side to help the Confederates with additional firepower.

Though not directly engaged, the 20th Tennessee started to receive fire which had passed over the 15th Mississippi.

"Boys, 'tis pretty rough but that is what we are here for," said Maj. Patrick Duffy of the 20th Tennessee, who had his horse shot out from under him before the regiment ever got close enough to engage the enemy.

The Federals reformed in better defensive positions, slowly contesting the ground while taking few losses. Around 7:35 a.m., the Confederates reformed again. The 25th Tennessee was sent back to the west side of the road to support the 19th Tennessee. The 15th Mississippi was supported by the 20th Tennessee.

Crittenden arrived on the scene and ordered the 20th Tennessee to deploy on the right to turn the Federal flank. He also ordered Falconnet to fire on Federal artillery from the dangerous 9th Ohio Battery. The 15th Mississippi moved into a wooded ravine, which provided cover for that unit to approach the Federals. Col. Speed Fry of the 4th Kentucky (Union), which had joined the Federal defense by that time, demanded the Confederates "stand up and fight like men."

The 20th Tennessee moved through Federal fire. Col. Joel Battle, the regiment's commanding officer, implored his men not to dodge the fire. Battle himself had to move quickly to avoid being hit by a large shell. "Boys, dodge the big ones, but don't dodge the little ones!" Cpl. William McMurray later reported Battle saying.

Artillery fire started to hit everywhere. Fire from the 9th Ohio Battery struck the corn bin near the Burton house and the family fled.



The 20th Tennessee tried to move around the Federal left flank, being guarded by the dismounted 1st Kentucky Cavalry, which drove in the 20th Tennessee's skirmish line. The 1st Kentucky Cavalry was able to hold off the 20th Tennessee despite inferior numbers. Superior weapons played a role in the fight. The Kentuckians were armed with Sharps rifles. Many of the Confederates were carrying flintlocks, shotguns and other assorted firearms not nearly in the same class. It was a theme that would be played out throughout the day.


About the same time, events escalated in the middle of the lines. As both sides took losses, Carroll's brigade finally made up the distance to join the fight. Led by the 17th Tennessee, the new Confederate units started to move into position. Also, with cavalry starting to arrive, the Confederates sent mounted units around the left flank. Kise was forced to pull back one company of his 10th Indiana to meet this new threat.

Lt. Col. William Kise, commanding the left (west) side, was forced to fall back around 8:20 a.m. under heavy pressure from the 19th Tennessee. Maj. Abram Miller also retreated with his four-company unit on the east side of the road, reporting the unit fell back in good order. There was a new problem for the Federals: they were running out of ammunition.

Fortunately for the Federals, troops of Col. Robert McCook's brigade arrived just in time to extend the Federal left. Some of these troops were not as experienced as the 10th Indiana. The 2nd Minnesota was a green unit under a veteran, Col. Horatio Van Cleve. "I will never forget the first shell that passed high above us, and our poor regiment settled nearly a foot in the muddy ground," stated Pvt. Hezekiah Bayless. These troops were the men of Col. Robert McCook's brigade. He had the 2nd Minnesota and 4th Kentucky arriving and the 9th Ohio on the way. Some of the men in the brigade had seen action in Western Virginia, including McCook.

Additionally, troops of Acting Brig. Gen. Samuel Carter moved up. These units included the 1st and 2nd East Tennessee as well as the 12th Kentucky. The new Federal line was set up near the south side of Logan's Cross Roads, also near the Federal camps. This line was away from the central fighting.

Both sides were struggling with the weather, which had turned rainy again. A cold and heavy downpour struck combatants of both sides, sparing nobody from being drenched. The 10th Indiana eventually had to withdraw from the action due to casualties and a lack of ammunition. Kise reported that most of his men were down to just 5-10 rounds. Lt. Louis Johnson of Co. E, 10th Indiana, reported the men in his company were out of ammunition.



With the 10th Indiana and 1st Kentucky Cavalry retiring, not necessarily in good order, the Confederates were not in position to take immediate advantage of the situation. Both Crittenden and Zollicoffer felt they had defeated the only Federal units in the area. But they were mistaken, and by tarrying, the Federals had enough time to organize their new line.

The Confederates realized their mistake of thinking the day was won when the advancing 15th Mississippi was hit by a volley from the 4th Kentucky. The 20th Tennessee swung around to the right of the 15th Mississippi and increased pressure on the 4th Kentucky.


“Coming out of the woods on the rise of another field, (we) found ourselves before the very face of the enemy, who opened on us a terrible fire. Our boys immediately commenced firing without waiting for orders and then the battle commenced in dead earnest,” wrote Lt. Albert Roberts of Co. A, 20th Tennessee.

Meanwhile, the 25th Tennessee pushed up on the right flank of the 4th Kentucky, crossing the Mill Springs Road. The 25th Tennessee, which included a number of black troops, opened fire on the 4th Kentucky’s Companies A, B and C with telling effect. However, the advantage the Confederates enjoyed washed away.

“We tried to fire our guns but they wouldn’t work because they had gotten wet. The Yankees had guns that always fired. Some of our boys got so mad that they bursted their guns against trees or threw them away,” stated Pvt. William C. Speck of the 25th Tennessee. The rain had rendered many of the flintlock rifles unusable. The Federals had percussion rifles, which worked better in the wet conditions. Wet weapons did more to stop the 25th Tennessee’s advance and saved the 4th Kentucky from having its right flank rolled up. The 25th Tennessee fell back to regroup.

About this time, the confusion factor also came into focus. At least one staff officer thought the 25th Tennessee had been attacking a sibling Confederate unit.

With a lull in the action, Col. Speed Fry worked to move his men to more protected positions. The 4th Kentucky, especially the right three companies, had been suffering while defending the Corn Field. Fry’s men regrouped alongside the remnants of the 10th Indiana near the edge of the Corn Field and the Old Road. About this time, 8:55 a.m., the 10th Indiana also was reorganizing and obtaining more ammunition. Thomas arrived near the battle site about this time and collected the 10th Indiana to return to the fighting. This regiment took position on the left of the 4th Kentucky. Volleys from the two Federal



units, and the rain affecting weapons, checked the advancing 20th Tennessee in the Corn Field.

The Confederate advance fell to the 15th Mississippi on the right side and the 19th Tennessee on the left. The 19th Tennessee had an easier time of it, marching on the intersection of Mill Springs Road and Old Road, which was guarded by a thrown-together group of Federal troops. On the other side, the 15th Mississippi fixed bayonets and pushed into the Corn Field, only to be forced to take cover in a ravine. Like the 25th Tennessee, the men of the 19th Tennessee ran into trouble with their weapons. Many refused to fire at all.

“Many of the men had old flintlock guns which were, in the rain, utterly useless,” said William Worsham of the 19th Tennessee.

Thus, a potential enveloping attack on the Federal right was stopped.

As mentioned, the 19th Tennessee and elements of the 4th Kentucky and 10th Indiana were closely involved at this time. And just who was friend and who was foe was not evident to all. Officers in different Confederate regiments were trying to halt fire, thinking they were shooting at their own forces. It was not something uncommon to the opposing troops early in the war. Adding to the confusion was the fact that many of the Confederates were uniformed in blue. For Lt. William B. Harrington, Co. C of the 15th Mississippi, the mistake was fatal as he was shot down while Walthall tried to ascertain whether or not forces at his front were friend or foe. They were members of the 4th Kentucky.


“For a brief time the hottest firing occurred that I was subjected to during the war,” said Pvt. Thomas T. Smith of the 15th Mississippi.

Some reports stated that Fry yelled at the 15th Mississippi, demanding that they come forward like men.

DEATH OF A GENERAL

With it being the first real action for just about everyone involved, there were many mistakes made on both sides. The biggest was by Zollicoffer, who, despite pleas not to go by his aides, moved to the front of the 19th Tennessee after hearing reports that the regiment was firing on the 15th Mississippi. Fry and his staff rode past the 19th Tennessee and up to a spot near the intersection of Mill Springs Road and Old Road.

Nearsighted to begin with, Zollicoffer mistook soldiers of the 10th Indiana regiment (which wore light gray state militia uniforms) for 15th Mississippi troops on the left side of his lines. Rain, fog and smoke made the visibility even worse.




Even Federals could not tell whether Zollicoffer was friend or foe. Some thought that he was Lt. Col. Frank Wolford of the 1st Kentucky. As was later recalled by Capt. James A. Vaughan of Co. B, 4th Kentucky, "A man rode around the angle in the road on a gray horse. He wore a white rubber coat and a blue army cap. Ten or 15 feet from the angle, he halted in full view, within 50 feet of us, reconnoitring. An East Tennessean, I forget his name, belonged to our regiment and wished me to give him a gun-cap quick, for he had lost his cap-box in the hurry that evening and he wished to shoot that man, saying 'that it was old Zolly himself.' I told him he was mistaken that it was Lt. Col. Wolford of the 1st Kentucky. I had met Wolford a day or two before, riding the same kind of horse and the man resembled him very much. The Tennessean assured me that he knew Gen. Zollicoffer better than myself and insisted on shooting him, but I would not allow him to do so."

Along the Federal line, other men had the same idea to shoot, but were cautioned against it as nobody seemed to be able to figure out who the strange figure was. Capt. David N. Steele of Manson's staff, felt the figure was a division quartermaster.

Zollicoffer approached Fry, who also had been trying to ascertain the situation, and ordered him to stop firing on his own men. Some have figured that Zollicoffer realized who Fry was and tried to bluff his way out of the situation. Zollicoffer successfully left the discussion when one of his aides, Lt. Henry M.R. Fogg, approached, yelling that Fry's and his men were the enemy. The aide shot at Fry, but hit his horse. The alarm did nothing but alert the Federals. Fry and others returned fire. Fry fired his revolver, hitting Zollicoffer in the hip. Fogg and Lt. Evan B. Shields were mortally wounded in the exchange. Sgt. Major Henry Ewing was the only Confederate to escape the meeting unscathed. Zollicoffer was hit several times and fell from his horse. About 9:30 a.m., Zollicoffer was down.

Reports differ on Zollicoffer's final words. "I was mistaken; they are the enemy; charge them." was one report. Another was "Go on, go on, my brave boys. I am killed."

For the meantime, the Confederates tried to withhold information on Zollicoffer's fate from his men. "Don't mention it yet, the general is dead," Ewing told Sgt. Major Henry Doak of the 19th Tennessee. Meanwhile, Confederates who had seen the general shot were in action to try to retrieve him. Having been ordered by the now-dead Zollicoffer to cease firing, the 19th Tennessee took



fire from the Federal right without returning it. The 19th Tennessee was forced to fall back in something less than an orderly readjustment of the lines. The Confederates had reached their zenith in the battle.

THE BATTLE CONTINUES

Command of Zollicoffer's brigade fell to Col. David Cummings of the 19th Tennessee, although the official confirmation of this did not come for a time.

The next general on the scene was Thomas and he rearranged his forces. The 10th Indiana was moved to the right, filling in some of the area recently vacated by the 19th Tennessee. Thomas ordered Capt. Alvan Gillem to bring up resupplies by wagon to bring the 10th Indiana back into the fight.

With Thomas on the scene, some of the troops that had been defending the camps were called forward.


Thomas was able to push two fresh regiments into the line, the 2nd Minnesota and 9th Ohio regiments. Thomas then ordered Samuel Carter's men on the left to swing around and try to hit the Confederates in the flank.

Crittenden moved to the front and tried to take control of the situation. The new plan of attack had the 15th Mississippi (main attack) and 20th Tennessee (holding the right flank) on the right side. Crittenden had been misinformed about their participation earlier in the day and felt that a frontal attack launched by those two regiments could win the day. Gen. William Carroll's brigade was to move up and support. On the left, the 19th Tennessee was expected to lead the assault on the left side of the line.

The general advance was ordered despite the fact Crittenden did not really know what he was facing. The 15th Mississippi taking up the vanguard on the right, was ordered to charge. What happened was an advance the men would never forget. Exposed to heavy fire from the 1st Kentucky and 4th Kentucky, the 15th Mississippi paid dearly for every foot of advance.

"Some of the best blood in the South went down," wrote an unknown soldier of Co. F of the 15th Mississippi. "The enemy then got out in the timber and fired on us heavily in the open field. There we fell a man to the minute for we were nearly surrounded - the main army being on our right and a regiment (1st Kentucky) armed with Colts (Sharps) revolving rifles just in the front," wrote Pvt. Charles C. Frierson, Co. F, 15th Mississippi, one of the wounded.

The Confederate attack seemed to be close to success until an artillery section joined the Union line at a key moment. The guns, under command of



Lt. Frank Viets, came from Battery C of the 1st Ohio. The two 6-pound brass pieces firing grapeshot swept the 15th Mississippi, adding to the casualties.

Still, the 15th Mississippi advanced to the fence position being held by the 4th Kentucky. Hand-to-hand fighting broke out. The 15th Mississippi used “cane knives” and other soldiers poked bayonets through the fence.

The side reinforced first would be the one to win the moment. And it was Federal troops joining the fray first. Both Fry and Walthall, commanding the 4th Kentucky and 15th Mississippi, respectively, were lightly wounded but did not leave the field.

The reinforcements came at the correct time. Alerted that the Kentuckians were running out of ammunition, Thomas implored them to hold until McCook’s men could come up and support.

Soon, the 2nd Minnesota and 9th Ohio (of Col. Robert McCook’s 3rd Brigade) joined the Federal effort, giving the Northerners a numerical advantage at the point of attack. Fighting was heavy. From the Confederate side, the 15th Mississippi carried most of the battle. The 28th Tennessee, the next closest fresh Confederate unit in support, was not in position to support the attack.

“The enemy was about to make a bayonet charge on the Kentucky boys, which if it had been made would have driven them down upon us and created much confusion,” wrote Pvt. Joseph McAlpin of Co. F, 2nd Minnesota.

CONFEDERATE DEFEAT AND RETREAT, AND OVERNIGHT ESCAPE

Both sides fell back briefly at times, but eventually, the Confederates were forced to yield ground to find cover. On the other side of the road, the 10th Indiana moved up into territory left vacant by the retiring 19th Tennessee. The 1st Kentucky Cavalry moved along the Mill Springs Road, threatening the left flank. The only thing halting the 1st Kentucky was the discovery of Zollicoffer’s body.

The 20th Tennessee, which had halted to dry out its flintlocks, was ordered to make a general advance. While this advance was taking place on one side of the road, the 19th Tennessee, and later, the 25th Tennessee, were being driven back by the 10th Indiana with support from the 9th Ohio. Col. Sidney Stanton of the 25th Tennessee, was wounded when he could not tell which force was approaching from the front. Neither Crittenden nor Cummings realized that their left wing was disintegrating.



While the advance of the 20th Tennessee allowed the survivors of the 15th Mississippi to escape destruction, it could not carry the day. The 20th Tennessee and 15th Mississippi slugged it out with the 2nd Minnesota and 4th Kentucky at the fence until the Confederates were forced to withdraw to regroup.

The Confederate alignment had not been done to form a complete line. Instead, Confederate forces were in two lines. The 19th Tennessee was followed by the 25th Tennessee on the left side. On the right, the 15th Mississippi was supported by an overlapping 20th Tennessee. The 28th Tennessee was behind with the 29th Tennessee following that regiment. The 17th Tennessee and 16th Alabama were holding near the artillery positions. Additionally, the 1st Tennessee (Union) and 12th Kentucky (Union) were moving into a flanking position to the right of the 15th Mississippi and 20th Tennessee. After Zollicoffer’s death, Crittenden was slow to fix the lines and engage the new threats.


Eventually, the Confederates were pushed back, as rain continued to plague them and their weapons. One soldier estimated that only 20 percent of the Confederate weapons worked. Only the 15th Mississippi, 16th Alabama and 29th Tennessee had some percussion weapons. Reportedly, many soldiers smashed their useless flintlock weapons against trees. Also, the terrain did not allow the Confederates to successfully employ artillery for long periods of time.

One by one, Confederate regiments were dumped into the fight to support others. The 15th Mississippi and 20th Tennessee, which had pushed far forward, were forced to retreat under heavy pressure from the flanks. The 9th Ohio, a German unit from Cincinnati, moved with a bayonet charge which broke the Confederate left. The 15th Mississippi and 20th Tennessee resisted. Lt. Bailie Peyton Jr., the 20th Tennessee’s Co. A commander, was killed while holding his position firing his pistol at the Federals.

The Confederates fell back in a general retreat. Some of Carroll’s troops were forced to fight a rear-guard action. During the fighting Col. (Acting Brig. Gen.) Robert McCook was hit in the leg, but did not leave his command.

“I’m shot in the leg, but I’m good for the day anyhow,” McCook later told a friend on Thomas’ staff.

Eventually, the 19th Tennessee, 17th Tennessee and 16th Alabama were left to hold off the Federal advance. A bayonet charge by the 9th Ohio broke the 17th Tennessee. Just before noon, the Confederates were headed back to the south, to relative the safety of their Beech Grove encampment ten miles away.



Just after noon, with the 9th Ohio and 2nd Minnesota leading the way, the pursuit was on. By 4:30 p.m., the Federal pursuit was coming within range of the Confederate camps. As he could not scout the camp before dark, Thomas just ordered an artillery bombardment, expecting to resume his attack the next morning. But that night, in a skilled operation, the Southern forces completely abandoned their camp, supplies, horses and artillery (12 cannon), and with the help of the *Noble Ellis* crossed the Cumberland River and reached their original encampment on the south side of the river, where Thomas could not reach them.

“The panic among them was so great that they even left a number of their sick and wounded in a dying state upon the river bank,” wrote Col. (Acting Brig. Gen.) Mahlon Manson.


AFTERMATH AND OVERVIEW

Those men who were able to move across the river were subsequently led by Crittenden on another retreat, to Cumberland Gap in eastern Tennessee. Thus, in the end, the Federals were unable to exploit their victory. After eliminating Zollicoffer’s outpost, they retired further into Kentucky. The Cumberland Gap area would trade hands several times after that in the Civil War, but it would not be this small force under Thomas taking it.

The fighting cost the Confederates 125 killed, 309 wounded and 99 missing. The 20th Tennessee of Col. Joel Battle lost 33 killed and 59 wounded. Col. Edward Walthall’s 15th Mississippi suffered 44 killed and 153 wounded. Among leaders, Co. Sidney Smith Stanton of the 25th Tennessee was wounded as was Col. Fry from the 4th Kentucky. On the Federal side, the casualties were significantly lower: 40 killed, 207 wounded, and 15 missing.

In Thomas the Federals found an able commander, as he directed an efficient battle, one that would characterize the Virginian’s Civil War service in the Federal Armies. Thomas went on to direct the Army of the Cumberland later in the war.

Just over two months after his exchange with Zollicoffer, Fry was promoted to brigadier general of volunteers (March 21, 1862). For the rest of the war, Fry’s commands either arrived too late to participate in major fights or were detained. He came under fire by Maj. Gen Don C. Buell as being “inefficient,” and ended the war in garrison duty and commanded Camp Nelson near Lexington, Kentucky, for much of the war.



Manson, who led the Federal troops in the first area of conflict at the battle, later was wounded and captured during Gen. Braxton Bragg’s Kentucky campaign. Exchanged, he briefly commanded the XXIII Corps after Chickamauga, but was reassigned to brigade command upon restructuring. He was badly wounded at Resaca, Georgia, May 14, 1864, which eventually led to his resignation from the army Dec. 21, 1864.

Zollicoffer’s body was returned to his family by the victors, although the trip from the battlefield to Nashville was a roundabout one.


Crittenden, the surviving senior Confederate commander, never overcame the criticism of his handling of the campaign and resigned his commission in October of 1862. Carroll’s brigade was lightly engaged at the battle and retreated in good order. Coming under fire from Gen. Braxton Bragg, Carroll was arrested for “drunkenness, incompetency and neglect.” Bragg reportedly stated Carroll was “not safe... to intrust with command.” The former colonel of the 37th Tennessee resigned his commission Feb. 1, 1863, and took his family to Canada, where he died just over five years later.

SOURCES INCLUDE:

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- Encyclopedia of the American Civil War*, Editors David S. Heidler and Jeanne T. Heidler
- Civil War Blunders*, by Clint Johnson
- The Civil War Battlefield Guide Second Edition*, by The Conservation Fund, Frances H. Kennedy, editor and principal contributor

INTERNET

- Wikipedia
- National Park Service Net
- www.millsprings.net by the Mill Springs Battlefield Association



ORDERS OF BATTLE FOR MILL SPRINGS (BEECH GROVE) (Alternate History)

<p>1st Brigade (Schoepf) (BG Albin Schoepf)</p>	<p>17th Ohio Infantry (COL John M. Connell) Strength: 500 Quality: 2.75 Guns: 100% Minnie Rifle</p> <p>31st Ohio Infantry (COL Moses B. Walker) Strength: 500 Quality: 2.75 Guns: 100% Springfield Rifle</p> <p>38th Ohio Infantry (COL Edwin D. Bradley) Strength: 500 Quality: 2.75 Guns: 100% Minnie Rifle</p> <p>Battery B, 1st Kentucky Light Artillery (CAPT John M. Hewett) Strength: 100 Quality: 2.75 Guns: 2 6-pd. Smoothbore / 2 12-pd. Howitzer</p> <p>Supply Wagons (Schoepf's Brigade) Strength: 25 Quality: 2.75 Guns: 100% Improvised</p>
	<p>10th Indiana Infantry (LTC William C. Kise, MAJ Abram O. Miller) Strength: 710 Quality: 3.5+++ Guns: 100% Enfield</p> <p>4th Kentucky Infantry (COL Speed S. Fry, LTC John T. Croxton) Strength: 400 Quality: 3.6+++ Guns: 50% Smoothbore Musket / 50% Minnie Rifle</p> <p>10th Kentucky Infantry (COL John M. Harlan) Strength: 500 Quality: 2.75 Guns: 50% Smoothbore Musket / 50% Minnie Rifle</p> <p>14th Ohio Infantry (COL James B. Steedman) Strength: 500 Quality: 2.75 Guns: 50% Smoothbore Musket / 50% Minnie Rifle</p>
	<p>2nd Minnesota Infantry (COL Horatio P. Van Cleve, LTC James George, MAJ Alexander Wilkin) Strength: 450 Quality: 3.3+++ Guns: 100% Springfield Rifle</p> <p>9th Ohio Infantry (MAJ Gustav Kammerling, MAJ Karl Joseph) Strength: 640 Quality: 3.3++ Guns: 50% Smoothbore Musket / 50% Minnie Rifle</p> <p>35th Ohio Infantry (COL Ferdinand Van Derveer) Strength: 500 Quality: 2.75 Guns: 50% Smoothbore Musket / 50% Minnie Rifle</p>
	<p>1st East Tennessee Infantry (COL Robert K. Byrd, LTC James G. Spears) Strength: 610 Quality: 3 Guns: 100% Smoothbore Musket</p> <p>2nd East Tennessee Infantry (COL James P. Carter, LTC Daniel C. Trewitt) Strength: 442 Quality: 3 Guns: 100% Smoothbore Musket</p> <p>12th Kentucky Infantry (COL William A. Hoskins, CAPT Cornelius C. Ham, CAPT Lawrence H. Rousseau) Strength: 478 Quality: 3 Guns: 50% Smoothbore Musket / 50% Minnie Rifle</p>
	<p>Battery B, 1st Ohio Light Artillery (CAPT William E. Standart, LT Eben Sturges, LT John A. Bennett) Strength: 122 Quality: 2.75 Guns: 6 6-pd. Smoothbore</p>
	<p>Battery C, 1st Ohio Light Artillery (CAPT Dennis Kenny, Jr., LT Frank Viets) Strength: 110 Quality: 2.75 Guns: 6 6-pd. Smoothbore</p>
	<p>9th Ohio Battery (CAPT Henry S. Wetmore) Strength: 104 Quality: 3.1 Guns: 2 10-pd. Parrott Rifle / 2 12-pd. Howitzer</p>
	<p>1st Kentucky Cavalry (COL Frank Wolford, MAJ John A. Brents) Strength: 250 Quality: 3.25+ Guns: 100% Sharps Carbine</p> <p>1st Michigan Engineers & Mechanics (2nd Detachment) (LTC Kinsman A. Hunton) Strength: 300 Quality: 2.75 Guns: 50% Smoothbore Musket / 50% Minnie Rifle</p> <p>Union Supply Wagons Strength: 25 Quality: 2.75 Guns: 100% Improvised</p> <p>Union Supply Wagons Strength: 25 Quality: 2.75 Guns: 100% Improvised</p>

ORDERS OF BATTLE FOR MILL SPRINGS (BEECH GROVE) (Alternate History)

<p>1st Brigade (Zollicoffer) (BG Felix K. Zollicoffer)</p>	<p>15th Mississippi Infantry (COL Winfield S. Statham, LTC Edward C. Waltrall) Strength: 820 Quality: 3.6+++ Guns: 50% Mississippi Rifle / 50% Smoothbore Musket</p> <p>19th Tennessee Infantry (COL David H. Cumming, LTC Francis M. Walker, MAJ Abraham Fulkerson) Strength: 675 Quality: 2.7 Guns: 60% Mississippi Rifle / 40% Flintlock musket</p> <p>20th Tennessee Infantry (COL Joel A. Battle, LTC Moscow B. Carter, MAJ Patrick Duffy) Strength: 700 Quality: 3.3++ Guns: 100% Flintlock musket</p> <p>25th Tennessee Infantry (COL Sidney S. Stanton) Strength: 675 Quality: 2.7 Guns: 60% Minnie Rifle / 40% Flintlock musket</p> <p>Rutledge's Tennessee Light Artillery Battery (LT Eugene F. Falconnet, LT Mark S. Cockrill) Strength: 140 Quality: 2.8 Guns: 4 6-pd. Smoothbore / 2 12-pd. Howitzer</p>
	<p>16th Alabama Infantry (COL William B. Wood, LTC John Harris) Strength: 380 Quality: 3+ Guns: 100% Springfield Rifle</p> <p>17th Tennessee Infantry (COL Tazewell Newman, LTC Thomas C.H. Miller) Strength: 400 Quality: 3.2++ Guns: 100% Flintlock musket</p> <p>28th Tennessee Infantry (COL John P. Murray) Strength: 750 Quality: 2.9 Guns: 60% Smoothbore Musket / 40% Flintlock musket</p> <p>29th Tennessee Infantry (COL Samuel Powel, MAJ Horace Rice) Strength: 650 Quality: 2.9+ Guns: 60% Minnie Rifle / 40% Flintlock musket</p> <p>McClung's Tennessee Battery (CAPT Hugh L.W. McClung, LT Elliott S. McClung) Strength: 80 Quality: 2.5 Guns: 2 12-pd. Howitzer / 2 6-pd. Smoothbore</p>
	<p>Branner's 4th Tennessee Cavalry Battalion (LTC Benjamin M. Branner) Strength: 335 Quality: 2.5 Guns: 100% Shotgun</p>
	<p>McClellan's 5th Tennessee Cavalry Battalion (LTC George R. McClellan) Strength: 315 Quality: 2.5 Guns: 100% Shotgun</p>
	<p>Bledsoe's Cavalry Company (CAPT Willis S. Bledsoe) Strength: 40 Quality: 2.95 Guns: 100% Shotgun</p>
	<p>Sanders's Cavalry Company (CAPT Q.C. (Ned) Sanders) Strength: 40 Quality: 2.95 Guns: 100% Shotgun</p>
	<p>McKenzie's 13th Tennessee Cavalry Battalion (LTC George W. McKenzie) Strength: 50 Quality: 2.5 Guns: 100% Shotgun</p>
	<p>Brazelton's 3rd Tennessee Cavalry Battalion (LTC William Brazelton, CAPT William Snow, CAPT William Gass) Strength: 80 Quality: 2.55 Guns: 100% Shotgun</p> <p>McNairy's 1st Tennessee Cavalry Battalion (LTC Frank N. McNairy, CAPT Tim Allison) Strength: 200 Quality: 2.5 Guns: 100% Shotgun</p> <p>37th Tennessee Infantry Regiment (COL Moses White, MAJ Edward F. Hunt) Strength: 400 Quality: 2.4 Guns: 80% Flintlock musket / 20% Improvised</p> <p>Monsarrat's Tennessee Artillery Battalion (CAPT George H. Monsarrat, LT Ed Baxter) Strength: 40 Quality: 2.5 Guns: 1 6-pd. Smoothbore / 1 Ordnance Rifle</p> <p>Monsarrat's Tennessee Artillery Battalion (sects. 2-3) Strength: 80 Quality: 2.5 Guns: 3 6-pd. Smoothbore / 1 Ordnance Rifle</p> <p>Confederate Supply Wagons Strength: 25 Quality: 2.75 Guns: 100% Improvised</p> <p>Confederate Supply Wagons Strength: 25 Quality: 2.75 Guns: 100% Improvised</p> <p>Confederate Supply Wagons Strength: 25 Quality: 2.75 Guns: 100% Improvised</p>

Western
Department
(Crittenden's
Division)
(MG George B.
Crittenden)

ORDERS OF BATTLE FOR MILL SPRINGS (Standard Scenario)

Department of the Ohio (1st Division) (BG George H. Thomas)	1st Brigade (Schoepf) (BG Albin Schoepf)	17th Ohio Infantry (COL John M. Connell) Strength: 500 Quality: 2.75 Guns: 100% Minnie Rifle 31st Ohio Infantry (COL Moses B. Walker) Strength: 500 Quality: 2.75 Guns: 100% Springfield Rifle 38th Ohio Infantry (COL Edwin D. Bradley) Strength: 500 Quality: 2.75 Guns: 100% Minnie Rifle Battery B, 1st Kentucky Light Artillery (CAPT John M. Hewett) Strength: 100 Quality: 2.75 Guns: 2 6-pd. Smoothbore / 2 12-pd. Howitzer Supply Wagons (Schoepf's Brigade) Strength: 25 Quality: 2.75 Guns: 100% Improvised
	2nd Brigade (Manson) (COL Mahlon D. Manson)	10th Indiana Infantry (LTC William C. Kise, MAJ Abram O. Miller) Strength: 710 Quality: 3.5+++ Guns: 100% Enfield 4th Kentucky Infantry (COL Speed S. Fry, LTC John T. Croxton) Strength: 400 Quality: 3.6+++ Guns: 50% Smoothbore Musket / 50% Minnie Rifle 10th Kentucky Infantry (COL John M. Harlan) Strength: 500 Quality: 2.75 Guns: 50% Smoothbore Musket / 50% Minnie Rifle 14th Ohio Infantry (COL James B. Steedman) Strength: 500 Quality: 2.75 Guns: 50% Smoothbore Musket / 50% Minnie Rifle
	3rd Brigade (McCook) (COL Robert L. McCook)	2nd Minnesota Infantry (COL Horatio P. Van Cleve, LTC James George, MAJ Alexander Wilkin) Strength: 400 Quality: 3.3+++ Guns: 100% Springfield Rifle Co. A, 2nd Minnesota Infantry (CAPT Judson Bishop) Strength: 50 Quality: 3.3 Guns: 100% Springfield Rifle 9th Ohio Infantry (MAJ Gustav Kammerling, MAJ Karl Joseph) Strength: 560 Quality: 3.3+ Guns: 50% Smoothbore Musket / 50% Minnie Rifle Co. I, 9th Ohio Infantry (CAPT John Gansen) Strength: 40 Quality: 3.3 Guns: 50% Smoothbore Musket / 50% Minnie Rifle Co. K, 9th Ohio Infantry (CAPT George Sommer) Strength: 40 Quality: 3.3 Guns: 50% Smoothbore Musket / 50% Minnie Rifle 35th Ohio Infantry (COL Ferdinand Van Derveer) Strength: 500 Quality: 2.75 Guns: 50% Smoothbore Musket / 50% Minnie Rifle
	12th Brigade (Carter) (COL Samuel P. Carter)	1st East Tennessee Infantry (COL Robert K. Byrd, LTC James G. Spears) Strength: 610 Quality: 3 Guns: 100% Smoothbore Musket 2nd East Tennessee Infantry (COL James P. Carter, LTC Daniel C. Trehwitt) Strength: 442 Quality: 3 Guns: 100% Smoothbore Musket 12th Kentucky Infantry (COL William A. Hoskins, CAPT Cornelius C. Ham, CAPT Lawrence H. Rousseau) Strength: 478 Quality: 3 Guns: 50% Smoothbore Musket / 50% Minnie Rifle
	Battery B, 1st Ohio Light Artillery (CAPT William E. Standart, LT Eben Sturges, LT John A. Bennett) Strength: 122 Quality: 2.75 Guns: 6 6-pd. Smoothbore	
	Battery C, 1st Ohio Light Artillery (CAPT Dennis Kenny, Jr., LT Frank Viets) Strength: 110 Quality: 2.75 Guns: 6 6-pd. Smoothbore	
	9th Ohio Battery (CAPT Henry S. Wetmore) Strength: 104 Quality: 3.1 Guns: 2 10-pdr. Parrott Rifle / 2 12-pd. Howitzer	
	1st Kentucky Cavalry (COL Frank Wolford, MAJ John A. Brents) Strength: 250 Quality: 3.25+ Guns: 100% Sharps Carbine	
	1st Michigan Engineers & Mechanics (2nd Detachment) (LTC Kinsman A. Hunton) Strength: 300 Quality: 2.75 Guns: 50% Smoothbore Musket / 50% Minnie Rifle	
	Union Supply Wagons Strength: 25 Quality: 2.75 Guns: 100% Improvised	

ORDERS OF BATTLE FOR MILL SPRINGS (Standard Scenario)

Western Department (Crittenden's Division) (MG George B. Crittenden)	1st Brigade (Zollicoffer) (BG Felix K. Zollicoffer)	15th Mississippi Infantry (COL Winfield S. Statham, LTC Edward C. Walthall) Strength: 520 Quality: 3.6+++ Guns: 50% Mississippi Rifle / 50% Smoothbore Musket 19th Tennessee Infantry (COL David H. Cumming, LTC Francis M. Walker, MAJ Abraham Fulkerson) Strength: 500 Quality: 2.7 Guns: 60% Mississippi Rifle / 40% Flintlock musket 20th Tennessee Infantry (COL Joel A. Battle, LTC Moscow B. Carter, MAJ Patrick Duffy) Strength: 500 Quality: 3.3+ Guns: 100% Flintlock musket 25th Tennessee Infantry (COL Sidney S. Stanton) Strength: 500 Quality: 2.7 Guns: 60% Minnie Rifle / 40% Flintlock musket Rutledge's Tennessee Light Artillery Battery (LT Eugene F. Falconnet, LT Mark S. Cockrill) Strength: 100 Quality: 2.8 Guns: 2 6-pd. Smoothbore / 2 12-pd. Howitzer Rutledge's Tennessee Light Artillery Battery (Sect. 3) Strength: 40 Quality: 2.8 Guns: 2 6-pd. Smoothbore
	2nd Brigade (Carroll) (BG William H. Carroll)	16th Alabama Infantry (COL William B. Wood, LTC John Harris) Strength: 330 Quality: 3+ Guns: 100% Springfield Rifle 17th Tennessee Infantry (COL Tazewell Newman, LTC Thomas C.H. Miller) Strength: 400 Quality: 3.2+ Guns: 100% Flintlock musket 28th Tennessee Infantry (COL John P. Murray) Strength: 500 Quality: 2.9 Guns: 60% Smoothbore Musket / 40% Flintlock musket 29th Tennessee Infantry (COL Samuel Powel, MAJ Horace Rice) Strength: 650 Quality: 2.9+ Guns: 60% Minnie Rifle / 40% Flintlock musket McClung's Tennessee Battery (Sect. 1) (CAPT Hugh L.W. McClung) Strength: 40 Quality: 2.5 Guns: 2 12-pd. Howitzer McClung's Tennessee Battery (Sect. 2) (LT Elliott S. McClung) Strength: 40 Quality: 2.5 Guns: 2 6-pd. Smoothbore
	Branner's 4th Tennessee Cavalry Battalion (LTC Benjamin M. Branner) Strength: 250 Quality: 2.5 Guns: 100% Shotgun	
	McClellan's 5th Tennessee Cavalry Battalion (LTC George R. McClellan) Strength: 210 Quality: 2.5 Guns: 100% Shotgun	
	Bledsoe's Cavalry Company (CAPT Willis S. Bledsoe) Strength: 40 Quality: 2.95 Guns: 100% Shotgun	
	Sanders's Cavalry Company (CAPT O.C. (Ned) Sanders) Strength: 40 Quality: 2.95 Guns: 100% Shotgun	
	Brazelton's 3rd Tennessee Cavalry Battalion (LTC William Brazelton, CAPT William Snow, CAPT William Gass) Strength: 80 Quality: 2.55 Guns: 100% Shotgun	
	37th Tennessee Infantry Regiment (COL Moses White, MAJ Edward F. Hunt) Strength: 400 Quality: 2.4 Guns: 80% Flintlock musket / 20% Improvised	
	Monsarrat's Tennessee Artillery Battalion (CAPT George H. Monsarrat, LT Ed Baxter) Strength: 40 Quality: 2.5 Guns: 1 6-pd. Smoothbore / 1 Ordnance Rifle	
	Confederate Supply Wagons Strength: 25 Quality: 2.75 Guns: 100% Improvised	